Growing dependence on imported oil has been a source of concern in the United States, despite potential consumer benefits from low cost imports. Much attention has focused on exposure to the instability of the world petroleum markets. Disadvantages that are associated with an embargo include incomplete adjustment with asset-fixity and unemployment (Tolly and Wilman, Broadman and Bruce). Offsetting use of policy instruments, such as import tax increases that reduce demand while acquiring strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), are effective at improving consumer welfare when embargo uncertainty is present (Teisburg, T.J.). Similarly, Yucell demonstrated the effectiveness of a combined gasoline tax and SPR. Others have examined the possibility that welfare would be higher with the optimum tariff in place (Bizer and Stuart). 
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Growing dqiendence on imported oU has been a source of concern in the United States, despite potential o^isumer benefits fixmi low cost in^rts. Much attentionhas focused on exposure to the instability of the world petroleum markets. Disadvantages that areassociated with anembargo include incomplete adjustment with assetfixity andunen^lqyment (Tolfy andWihnan, Broadman andBruce). Ofisetting useof policy instruments, such as import taxincreases that reduce demand while acquiring strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), are effective at m^jroving consumer welfare \^hen embargo uncertainty ispresent (Teisburg, T.J). Similarly, Yucell demonstrated the eSectiveBess ofacranbm^gasoline taxand SPR, Others have examined the possibility that welfare would be higherwith the optimum tariff in place (Bizerand Stuart).
Substitute fiiels are ofleii regarded ashigh cost alternatives toiiBports Forinstance, new coal and nuclei power costs^fine aniq)per limit inpetroleum pricing decisions (OPEC Bulletin). Fuels made fi'om agricultural materials are also regarded as high cost, due to processing costs anda limited amount of land suitable forcom production 04eddK)^Tyner and Holland). Further, ethanol will not becompetitive inthe fiiel m^ket using comprocessing technology in the mtermediate ran (Kane, etal) . Nonetheless, fuels and chemical products made fi'om agricultural materials may deserve another look because there is some new technology for converting cellulose into ethanol. This stucfy reviews the prospects for a new fuel technology and wcamines the price and wdfare implications for the North American petroleum market. One distinginshmg feature of this stucfy* is analvsis of the effect ofnew technology in an importing country that faces limited market power iri,trade. Also, given the history ofthe North American petroleum trade, measurement ofthe new technology's option value for reducing the ad\'erse effects ofan embargo is mqjortant for the welfare analysis. Aconceptual analvsis ofthe market and welfare effects ofnewtechnologv-are discussed in the next two sections. Afterwards, afavorable e\-aluation for the competitiveness and supply potential of anew ethanol technology is presented.
Next, smiulations suggest that new supplies will reduce petroleum prices moderately and increase consumers" welfare. Further, there are gains to the owners ofnew resources associated with fuel production, and the option value ofthe new technology for reducing an embargo's disruption is important Overall, there is anet gain for the U.S. when these benefits are wiighed against the losses ofestabUshed domestic petroleum producers. The net gains for the United States offset the losses ofimporting countries.
Price Formation, Embargoes and New Technology
Mabro recently suggested that oligopoly pricing occurs in the world petroleum markets. OPEC usually has some price-setting ability but fuU monopoly exploitation is limited by market-share requirements ofsome mdividual members and unpredictable supplies from the competitive fringe. The supplies of the competitive fringe are defined mainlylyprocessing capacityin the shortrun butrespond to price increases in the intermediate run, as exploration leads to new reserves. As afirst approximation, the limited supply that is prominent in resource models is offset by reserve discovery, time discounting and avery distant friture.
Consider the U.S. petroleum trade with oligopoly pricing. In Figure 1 . the U.S. demand is represented by D. mpanel b. Siqjplyis given as the sum ofexcess siqjpBes from the fringe, ESj, (mainly Canada and Mexico) and domestic U.S. suppKes, S.. The residual demand for OPEC oil is given by the difference between HfmpnH and the sum ofdomestic and fringe supplies. This excess demand is given by ED in panel a. The OPEC cartel follows apricing strategy that balances perceived marginal revenues from additional supplies (Mig and production costs (CJ, which defines the equihbrium price ? in panel a. Notice that the oligopoly price is somewhat higher than the price that would prevail in acompetitive market, which is C".
AIwothetical embaigo is also shown in Figure 1 . SpecificaUy, the north American maricet clears at its autarky price, P., in the event that imports from OPEC are prohibited. Then the net welfare loss for North America is gi.-en by the mangle' s area E, «hich is below the excess demand curve and above the initial price line. This is the American welfare loss in the event that no imports are available. Ironically, the north American welfare loss under an embargo is also the welfare gain in the event offree trade.
OPEC profits also decline in the event of on embargo, by the size ofinitial profits from north .^merican sales (area Hin panel a). The profit loss suggests that the embargo would not be undertaken for apurely ' economic reason. Now consider the prospect ofa technology change that increases the supply ofpetroleum or asimilar material that can be used in the production ofproducts like gasoline and chemicals. In figure 2 , the supply schedule shifts rightward by the amount St. In turn, the excess demand, marginal revenue and oil price are all reduced, preserving the balance between perceived marginal costs and marginal revenues in panel a. Imports and prices both decline with the supply increase, from to Ij, and from to Pj. Both the Price effects and Benefit changes differ from die outcome that would occur in a competitive market without the possibility ofan embargo. Under competition with trade certaint\-, the price would be C,, before and after the price change. Hence domestic consumers and petroleum producers would not experience a benefit from the technology. But owners ofthe new supply would receive benefits that are defined by the cost of producing petroleum. In the presence of oligopoly pricing then, the producer returns to the technology in\ estment are larger (areas F-Kj), defined by the oligopoly price ofoil. Further, there is aconsumer benefit which exceeds the loss to established domestic petroleum producers.
Model of an Oligopoly Market
An algebraicstatementofmaiket relationships is convenient for measuring the effects of new technology when there is market power in the import market. The import demand function is the differencebetween supply and demand where Qj represents imports. So the price dependent fonn of the import demand fimction is c. dp Q. = -t E+ g? y_ -s dp
tructure and maricet conditions affect miports, according to the import response fimction. Imports vary inversely with the extent ofmarket power, i.e. Qj decreases with increases in X. Moreover, changing market conditions affect imports; increases in alternative supplies, increasing OPEC costs and falling income all reduce the import allocation to the Americanmarket.
The market relationships can be included in asj'stem ofequations for comprehensive determination oftrade and prices. In addition to the supply, demand and OPEC response fimction discussed above, the determinants ofproduction costs and an equilibrium condition are also included. Thus,the mixedsugars fixjm cellulose and hemi-cellulose components are processed in the same process train,
.viiich reduces equipment costs. Hence the problem oflow yields and separate fermentation processes associated with cellulosic material, are largely overcome.
The potential yield increase is largebecause it essentially doubles the ethanol available in the processing of woo^biomass andcrop materials intoethanol. Prior to thepossibility ofr^id pentose conversion, yields on tfie orda* of.191b edianol/lb wood chips were possible. Now, yields onthe order of .42 lb ethanol/Ibof dry mattw biomass are realistic if new technology meets expectations(NationaI Academy of Sciences).
The chemical process is just entering the demonstration phase; eadi component reaction has been verified atsome scale ofoperation.. However, anintegrated test plant has not operated for an extended period.
Thus, expectations \^t11 be confirmed in about five years unless unforseen technical difficulties or high e?q)cnditures on plant operation occur(U.S. Dept. ofEnergy); Specifically, arecent cost stu(fy that isbased on best case expected yields, projected capital and equipment needs and current market conditions. The projections suggest that ethanol could have a price comparable to the wholesale gasoline price by processing from woodch^s in alarge plant Recent competition for woodchips from the paper industry for fiber usage hag escalated, which may alter these economics.
Accordmgly, Midwestern com stover, techmcally smtable as afeedstock iii the new ethanol process, deserves consideration as acommercial raw material. Indeed, stalks may be alow-valued input that is well suited to the Midwest, as it is not necessary to recover land costs that have alrca<^been taken into account in com profit calculations and output decisions.
Prssenti^. the economic value ofcom stover arises from t^vo sources. First, erosion levels and fertiiizcr requirements are bodi reduced when com sto\ er is left on the ground. Second com 3tc\ er provide alow-grade *com stover is die residue from com grain harvesting, consisting ofstalks, leaves, cobs, and husk.
^9
, hay when fed to cattle. As a first approximatioii then, the stover supply curve facing ethanol processors in a region is a step function (see figure 3) . Initially, it is horizontal at net harvest cost; processing plants in wellchosen locationsin cash-gr^areas could acquirestalksthat arenot used by livestock producers at slightly above harvestcost The second stq) of the si5)ply function is definedby the higher value that livestock's producers are willingto p^whenusingstoveras a feed. All availablestalk supplies would be diverted to industrial uses if the processOTs are willing to p^sHghtly morethanthe livestock value. The stalk siqsply is vertical at the point where all available si^plies are used by industry, provided that the amount of land that is plantedto com is given. Thus, the DOE cost study is now adaptedto a corn-stalk-based process. The analysis require several phases; the Midwest supply of com residue; processing yield and material flow adjustments that affect the processing costs; andthe potential role of transport costs as a limiting factor on the location of a large plant.
Each of these factors is considered below.
The net harvest cost estimates for comstaIks (table 1) include harvest expenses and fertilizer replacemoit costs. Harvesting costs are approximated by machinery replacement and operating costs for harvesting hay.
Machmeiy and opCTatmg costs are converted to tons using a stalk yield estimate fi"om agronomic data; soa cost a(^ustment associated with the fact that stalk yield issomewhat less than hay yield is taken into account. Also, the stover yield does allow for an amount left on the field for conservation compliance. Further, the fertilizer cost estimate is based on replacement ofthe phosphorous and potassiimi (Claar etal.) . Using hay harvest costs.
$ fertilizer replacement, 30 percent residue left on the field for conservation compliance gives astalks net harvest costof S16.5/ton.
The transportation component ofmaterial costs increases with capacity because greater distances are traveled to secure supplies.' Atransport cost adjustment increases the delivered input cost to S19.8/ton.
Similarly, the feed value ofhay can be calculated using seme adjustments for total digestible nutrients and protein deficiencies ofcomstover in compariscn to hay (Stroben and Ajtss). Stover's value as a feed can be calculated from die 1994 hay price at about S35/ton.
The DOE "study is the reference point for cost estimates on cornstalk processing. However, several adjustments wererequired. In particular, the lignin content of com stover is only one-half of that for wood chips, so the one-halfofelectrical plantcapacitythat was soldas a byproductcredit is removed. Also, the 10%gasoline mixingoperationwas eliminated so that estimates nowreferto a pure ethanol basis. Regarding financial matters, the capitalallowance was calculated at a 10%returnanda 15-year amortization period. Also,inputprice and coital costswereupdatedto a 1993 basis. Finally, cornstalk harvesting costs calculated are usedfor feedstock costs.
Therevised material flows andcostestimates are shown in table 2. Thebottomlineis an overall production costfor ethanol of $.46/gal. Ethanol production at this cost would be competitive with gasoline, even wthout subsidies.
Engineering estimates ofcost rely onmaterial flows and theequipment requirement for a small plant. Then 
B. Supply Estimate
The volume ofcomstalks that would be available to the processing industry can be approximated by using estimates ofavailable comstover, cattle's population md forage requirements, and the availability ofha>' for forage. Specifically, the total stover supply estimate is given by state at the LHS of This estimate may be on the conservative side; because the included states account for only 75% of com production; because area planted and stalk output can respond to increasedprofitability; and because wood residues have not been included.
Petroleum Market Simulations
The effect ofthe new edianol supply on the U.S. petroleum market is estimated using the simulation model with quantitative estimates of response and cost flmctions.
Results from recent studies ofthe U.S. petroleum market provide estimates ofdemand, cost and siq)ply of petroleum. For instance, Yucell provides estimates ofcost functions for OPEC and the United States, which are used for marginal revenue and producer smplus calculations. Jones provides some estimates ofU.S. petroleum market demand-the price elasticity is -.17 for the long run and -.07 for the short run. Finally, a rational expectation stut^of U.S. petroleum supply includes the ten-year response of drilling and new reserve development; the long-run response to a sustained price increase is described by a supply elasticity of0.15
(Walls). The conesponding (me j-ear response is .04. Esiimaies for supply and demand point to ahighly inelastic structure in the petroleum market, e\"en inthe long-nm.
Next, apprcximaticais fa* market relationships are developed by calculating linear functions and normalizing onacuial 1992 data. Simulations were based on long-run elasticities. But embargo-effect estimates are based on short-iun elasticities because ofthe limited adjustments that are possible during aone-year trade disruption.
The OPEC import response function isestimated using observed costs, imports and pricing behavior for the 1992 baseline. Inverting the mqwrt response fimcticm gives the implied estimate ofthe market power coefficient:
The estimated value firom 1992 data is 0.866, suggesting less than full monopoly pricing.
Thewelfare changes diatcorrespond tothemarket leallocations are alsoincluded in thesimulation exercise.
Welfare estimates are based on surplus measures and income indicators. Consumer surplus approximates willingness to pay (Willig). The excess ofreturns over variable costs measures producer welf^e (Just,et al).
The exogenous supply increase is the petroleum equivalent ofthe ethanol that is produced from cornstalks.
In lieu ofan extensive model offactor-product relationships and demand for products, the direct substitution assumption is agood approximation. Ethanol is blended with gasoline for octane improvement anH otherwise used for producing the dominant plastic feedstock (ethylene). The 242.4 mill bbl ofnew supply is the petroleumequivalent energ}' ofthe ethanol supply^. On balance, the estimate ofnew supplies is probably conservative, because substitution for chemical inputs would likely occur on apound-for-pound basis.
Changes in the petroleum market supply, import and price that are associated with the technology change are given in table 4. The supply expansion causes amarket reallocation; domestic price falls in response to the new supply. The price reduction of 6.7% is slightly larger than the corresponding supply increase. Also, domestic demand increases and imports fall.
Welfare changes in the petroleum sector reflect the price change. There are losses for producers and gains for consumers. For the U.S., the consumers' gain exceeds the producers' loss; there is a$2.0 bill gain for participants in the U.S. petroleum market OPEC producers lose about $3.0 bUl and fringe suppUers loose about $0.9 bill.
But the United State's benefits e.Mend be>-ond the petroleum market benefits. Benefits to com producers that are associated with the new technology-are measured in the input market. In general, the benefit to com producers is the vertical differoice between the derived demand and die supply curve for comstover. As a first proximation, thisbenefit is given bythearea U+Lin figure 3 , where the deriveddemand curveis approximated by the difference between the post-change gasoline price and ethanol processing costs, which areexpressed in input (cornstalk) umts. Similarly, the steps inthe supply function are defined byharvest costs and annual feed values. The estimated benefits to com producers are about $1.4 bil."* Next, consider estimates of security benefits for theU.S. There aretwosources of loss associated with the embargo. First, the reduction ofthe trade surplus loss is calculated fi'om estimated supply and HemanH fimctions.
The trade surplus in &e initialstate is calculated as the area behind the excess demand curve andbetween the initial pricein the trade statePg and theautarl^price P.
TS^=!l'ED{P) dP=J (a^-a^) -(P^+3^) dP
Equations 1to in terms of lost manufacmHng wages, could be reduced by S7.88 bil. in the e>-em that the ne^v technology is 14 available during a one year embargo.
Next, evaluate the odds and the expected value ofreducingembargo-relatedlosses. There have been three disn^tive events in the last twodecades: Saudi Arabia in 1973 , Iranin 1990 , andIraq-Kuwait in 1990 . So the probability of a di5nq)tic»i is about .15. Hencethe e?q)ected valueof the technology relatedgains in the event of an embargo is thesum of trade and employment gains times the disruption probability, about $2.38 bill.
Further, total embargos have typically not been imposed on the U.S. petroleum maricet; the average fraction that trade has been reduced during actual embargoes isabout .2. When the expected value ismultiplied by the export reduction fraction, the expected loss estimate is about $.48 bill. The expected loss isthe option value ofthe ethanol siqipfy increase itgives the expected value ofthe loss that will be avoided with the technology investment.
This option iswortii about $2.4 for a total embargo and about $ 0.5 bill for apartial embargo.
The overall e?q)ected welfare gain to the united States is the probability-weighted average ofstate-dependent net welfare gains (table 5) . When agricultural producers' benefits are included with petroleum consumers and producers in &e trade state, tibe net benefit to the U.S. in the trade state is a$3.4 bill. And the probability ofthe trade state is 0.85, so the expected gain from the trade state is a$2.9 bill. The overall expected gain to the U.
S. both states is about $5.27 for atotal embargo and $3.4 bill and for apartial embargo. In either event the option value related to embargo protection comprises asignificant proportion ofthe overall welfare gain Summary and Conclusions This study has examined the potential effect ofsome new technology on the petroleum market. This technology should enable efGcient ethanol production from cellulose materials like woodchips and cornstalks.
Engineering cost data suggest that comstalk-based production can be competitive with some major petroleum products. Further, available supplies are enough to make adifference in the petroleum market. Improvements in the terms of trade result in gains to petroleum consumers and agricultural processors, while losses accrue to established petroleum producers. Further, there is anet increase iii U.S. welfare. The supply expansion is moderate. Howe^-er, phce effects stiJl make adiff^nce because the U.S. petroleum market has aprice-inelastic structure.
fieetrade. First, the supplyoffsets oligopoly pricing, reducing prices and increasing consumer benefits. Also, there is a moderate optionvaluefor reducing losses in the event of an embargo. The estimates here suggest that overall benefits to the U.S. will be imderestimated by 15 percent if the costs of partial embargos are excluded fi"om the benefit-cost analysis. When the benefits of mitigating oHgopoly structure and uncertain trade are combined with producer benefits fi'om the ne\v technology, the domestic supply increase looks like a good investment, fi'om the viewpoint ofthe public sector and the private sector. Footnotes 1. The phj'-sical relationbetweendistance from the plant (r) and available supplies can be approximated by Q=iur^)dy which is the product of the areaof a circle of radius r, icr^, andthe density of com stalk, cfy. In turn, stalk density is the product of yield and the density of planted comar^. When Qis set at thecapacity of the processing plant, the maximum distance from the plant can be obtained by rearranging r' = Jq/ (ndy) .
For example, the average com density and net stalk yield for Iowa are 187.62 acre/mi^and y = 2 ton/acre. Further, fteannualinputrequiresnent forourhypothetical plantis Q= 2.903 miltons. Hence, the largeplantmustuse all available comstover within a 49.6mileradius of theplant.
Todetermine the cost-distance relationship, notice that the production obtained from a ring of a given distance from the plant is givenby the productof circumference of the circle, the widthof thering and the density of cornstalks is aQ = (27cr)(dy)Ar.
Then the marginal cost ofexpanding the outer circle by the increment ai isgiven by C'(r) =P(r)(2TO)(^)Ar. P(r) isthe price gradient frmction describing the price-distance surface-in a well chosen location, the price gradient should bethe sum ofstalk harvest and transport costs. With a linear price gradient, the total cost Recent quotations from Iowa trucking firms indicate that the transportation rate is between $. l/ton/mile and $.15/ton/niile for short distances. Next, set Po=$16.5/ton from stalk har\'est cost. Then the average cost ofall stover drawn from within 49.6 miles'" is between $19,8/ton and $21.5/ton. The lower stover cost estimate is used in the processing cost stu^because the routine of a large plant would reduce the short-haul rate
The difference between the wholesale gasoline price and ethanol processing costs for 1994, converted to 
